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Abstract
Past estimates of the eect of family income on child development have often been plagued
by endogeneity and measurement error. In this paper, we use an instrumental variables strategy
to estimate the causal eect of income on children's math and reading achievement. Our iden-
tication derives from the large, non-linear changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
over the last two decades. The largest of these changes increased family income by as much
as 20%, or approximately $2,100, between 1993 and 1997. Using a panel of roughly 4,500 chil-
dren matched to their mothers from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth datasets allows us
to address problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity, endogenous transitory income
shocks, and measurement error in income. Our baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase
in income raises combined math and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation in the
short-run. Test gains are larger for children from disadvantaged families and are robust to a
variety of alternative specications.
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1 Introduction
In 2008, 13.2 million children in the U.S. under the age of 18, or more than one in six children, were
living in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Given such a high poverty rate, the consequences
of growing up poor on child well-being and future success has emerged as an important research
topic. Of particular interest is whether income support programs like the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) can improve child development. However, the extent to which income maintenance
programs, and family income more generally, impact children is not easily estimated.
The major challenge faced by researchers attempting to estimate the causal eect of family
income on children's outcomes has been the endogeneity of income. Children growing up in poor
families are likely to have adverse home environments or face other challenges which would continue
to aect their development even if family income were to increase substantially. Furthermore, year-
to-year changes in family circumstances like parental job loss or promotion, illness, or moving
to a new neighborhood may aect both family income as well as family dynamics and parenting
behavior. The latter poses a problem for traditional empirical studies that fail to separately identify
the eects caused by changes in income from the eects of changes in other unmeasured family
circumstances. These concerns have long prevented the literature from reaching a consensus on
whether family income has a causal eect on child development (see Duncan and Brooks-Gunn
(1997), Haveman and Wolfe (1995), Mayer (1997)).
Since the mid-1990s, one of the largest federal anti-poverty programs in the U.S. has been the
EITC, which provides cash assistance to low-income families and individuals who have earnings
from work.1 Low income families with two or more children can receive a credit of up to 40% of
their income in recent years (up to $4,824 in 2008), while families with one child can receive a credit
of up to 34%. In 2007, the EITC provided $48.7 billion in income benets to 25 million families
and individuals, lifting more children out of poverty than any other government program (Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). It is natural to ask what eect the EITC and other income
maintenance programs have on disadvantaged children.
Expansions of the EITC in the late 1980s and 1990s provide an exogenous source of income
variation for American families that we use to identify the eects of family income on child achieve-
ment. Figure 1 shows that EITC expansions over this period were sizeable and primarily benetted
low to middle income families. Not only did the maximum benet amount increase substantially,
1See Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for detailed descriptions of the EITC program and a
summary of related research.
1
but the range of family income which qualied families for EITC benets also expanded. The gure
shows that two-child families with pre-tax incomes ranging from $12,000-16,000 would have seen
their EITC payments increase by as much as $900 from 1987 to 1993 and another $2,100 between
1993 and 1997.2 The maximum subsidy rate for low income families with two children doubled from
19.5% to 40% of earned income over the latter period. Expansions for single-child families were
quite similar to those for two-child families prior to 1993; however, they have been more modest
since.
We estimate the impact of changes in family income (resulting from the EITC expansions) on
child cognitive achievement. Our estimation strategy is based on the fact that low to middle income
families benetted substantially from expansions of the EITC in the late-1980s and mid-1990s while
higher income families did not. To the extent that income aects child achievement, we should
observe relative improvements in the test scores of children from families benetting the most from
the EITC expansions.
Our analysis uses panel data on almost 4,500 children matched to their mothers in the Children
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). These data contain a rich set of income
and demographic measures. More importantly, these data have up to ve repeated measures of
cognitive test scores per child taken every other year, which allows us to account for unobserved
child xed eects.
Our instrumental variables estimates suggest that current income has a signicant eect on a
child's math and reading achievement | a $1,000 increase in family income raises math and reading
test scores by about 6% of a standard deviation. The estimated eects are larger for children from
more disadvantaged backgrounds, for younger children, and for boys. Simple dynamic models
suggest that contemporaneous income has the largest eect on achievement, with small eects
from past income.
While modest, our instrumental variables estimates are larger than cross-section ordinary least
squares (OLS) or standard xed eects (FE) estimates. Several explanations may account for this
dierence. One is that income is noisily measured, so that OLS and FE estimates suer from
attenuation bias. It is also possible that income matters more for the most disadvantaged and that
our instrument largely reects the eect of income for these families. Perhaps the most interesting
2All dollar amounts are reported in year 2000 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers
(CPI-U) to adjust for ination. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 began to adjust maximum credit amounts and phase-
in/phase-out regions for cost-of-living changes in years that did not specically legislate changes in the EITC schedule.
However, the federal tax adjustment is based on the CPI from the previous year (rather than the current year as
used in our calculations). This explains why the reported maximum credit in our gures is about $30 less in 1989
than it was in 1987.
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explanation is that expectations about future income play an important role in determining child
outcomes. In this case, permanent changes in family income should have larger eects on children
than do temporary changes. To the extent that changes in the EITC are expected to last longer
than most idiosyncratic shocks to family income, our instrumental variables estimates should be
greater than traditional OLS and xed eect estimates (see Dahl and Lochner (2005)).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we give a brief literature review. Section 3
discusses our strategy for estimating the eect of family income on child outcomes. We then discuss
the data and document the large changes in the EITC in Section 4. Section 5 presents estimates of
the eect of income on math and reading test scores, including results from a variety of alternative
specications and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous Research
A growing empirical literature questions how poverty aects a child's well-being and whether income
support programs can improve a child's life chances. However, evidence on the extent to which
family income aects child development is mixed. Previous studies dier in data, methods, and
ndings, as discussed in the collection of studies in Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997) or the surveys
in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Mayer (1997).
Researchers have provided several explanations for why family income might aect child devel-
opment. First, poverty is associated with increased levels of parental stress, depression, and poor
health | conditions which might adversely aect parents' ability to nurture their children (see,
e.g., McLoyd 1990). For example, in 1998, 27% of kindergartners living in poverty had a parent
at risk for depression, compared to 14% for other kindergartners (Child Trends and Center for
Child Health Research, 2004). Low income parents also report a higher level of frustration and
aggravation with their children, and these children are more likely to have poor verbal development
and exhibit higher levels of distractability and hostility in the classroom (Parker et. al, 1999).
Two recent working papers examine income transfer programs in Canada and the U.S. and nd
evidence that income transfers improve a family's emotional well-being. Milligan and Stabile (2009)
nd signicant positive eects on self-reported child and maternal mental health, and Evans and
Garthwaite (2010) nd lower levels of self-reported maternal stress and a drop in the probability of
risky levels of biomarkers associated with stress. Extra family income might also matter if parents
use the money for child-centered goods like books, for quality daycare or preschool programs, for
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better dependent health care, or to move to a better neighborhood.3
Until very recently, empirical studies linking poverty and income to child outcomes have done
little to eliminate biases caused by the omission of unobserved family and child characteristics. Most
studies employ regressions of an outcome variable (such as scholastic achievement) on some measure
of family income and a set of observable family, child, and neighborhood characteristics. While these
studies reveal the correlations between income and child outcomes, they do not necessarily estimate
a causal relationship as Mayer (1997), Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), and others have pointed
out. Children living in poor families may have a worse home environment or other characteristics
that the researcher does not observe. These omitted variables may be part of the reason for
substandard achievement and may continue to aect children's development even if family income
were to rise.
Blau (1999), Duncan, et. al (1998), and Levy and Duncan (1999) use xed eects estimation
strategies to eliminate biases caused by permanent family or child characteristics. All three studies
use dierences in family income levels across siblings to remove xed family factors when estimating
the impacts of income on child outcomes. Using PSID data, both Duncan, et. al (1998) and Levy and
Duncan (1999) nd that family income at early ages is more important for determining educational
attainment whether they control for xed family eects or not. Using data from the Children
of the NLSY, Blau (1999) reaches somewhat dierent conclusions. He estimates larger eects of
\permanent income" when he controls for \grandparent xed eects" (i.e. comparing outcomes for
the children of sisters) than when he does not. However, he nds smaller and insignicant eects of
current family income on achievement and behavioral outcomes when he uses xed eect strategies
(regardless of whether he uses comparisons of cousins, siblings, or repeated observations for the
same individual) rather than OLS. While these studies represent a signicant step forward, they
do not control for endogenous transitory shocks (e.g. parental job loss or promotion, family illness,
residential moves) and likely suer from severe attenuation bias, since growth in income is typically
noisily measured.
A few recent studies attempt to address these problems in a variety of ways. Two quasi-
experimental studies estimate the impacts of government income transfers on children. Duncan,
Morris and Rodrigues (2007) combine data from ten welfare and anti-poverty experiments in an
attempt to identify the eect of family income separately from employment and welfare eects
3Children in poor families spend less time reading with their parents, are less likely to receive adequate health
care and nutrition, and attend underfunded public schools, all of which are negatively associated with academic
performance (Child Trends and Center for Child Health Research, 2004).
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induced by the programs. Milligan and Stabile (2009) estimate the impacts of changes in child
tax benets in Canada on child outcomes using variation in benet changes by province and the
number of children in the household. These studies nd modest to large eects of family income
on child educational and achievement outcomes that are largely consistent with our estimates. A
second set of studies (Lken 2010, Lken, Mogstad and Wiswall 2010) estimates the impact of
family income on the educational attainment and IQ of Norwegian children using regional variation
in the economic boom following the discovery of oil as an instrument for income. Generalizing
the specication of Lken (2010), Lken, Mogstad and Wiswall (2010) estimate that income has
sizeable impacts on education and IQ among children from low-income families; however, those
eects decline sharply among higher income families.4
The conclusions reached by recent studies suggest that unobserved heterogeneity and endoge-
nous income shocks are important concerns. Furthermore, they suggest that income eects may
be greatest among economically disadvantaged families. In the following section, we outline an
instrumental variables strategy which eliminates omitted variable biases due to both permanent
and temporary shocks correlated with family income and alleviates bias due to measurement error
in income. Given our source of exogenous income variation (changes in the EITC), our strategy
identies the eects of family income on achievement for children from lower-income families.
Using our instrumental variables approach, we explore a few simple dynamic specications
of child achievement that allow for lasting eects of family income on children. Few previous
studies explore dynamic relationships between family income and child achievement. Those that
do tend to focus on the relative importance of family income received at dierent child ages and
are subject to the same concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous family income
shocks as described above. Most of these studies nd that income received when a child is young
has stronger lasting impacts than does income received during later childhood or adolescence (see
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997 and Duncan et al. 1998).5
4Other evidence from recent studies on the eects of parental education and job displacement indirectly suggests
that family income may have important eects on children (Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2005, Oreopoulos, Page
and Stevens 2006, 2008).
5Related studies estimate dynamic models of child development as a function of family and school inputs. For
example, Todd and Wolpin (2007) estimate a dynamic model of both family and school inputs into child development.
Their estimates imply strong lasting eects of family inputs (e.g. number of books in the home) but relatively weak
eects of measured school inputs (e.g. teacher salary).
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3 Methodology
3.1 Modeling Child Achievement
Child achievement potentially depends on a child's ability, as well as other past and present child
inputs (e.g. parental time, books, neighborhoods, schools, and home environments). Since family
income aects decisions about investment in children, as well as parental stress and whether the
general home environment is conducive to development, current and lagged family income have the
potential to aect child outcomes at any particular age. In this section, we model how changes in
family income (through such policies as the EITC) aect child achievement.
Let xi reect observable permanent characteristics and i reect unobserved permanent `ability'
for child i (i.e., a child xed eect). These measures can also incorporate unobserved long-run
dierences across families. Let wia reect time-varying characteristics and Iia total family income
(net of any taxes and transfers, including EITC payments) for child i at age a. Finally, let "ia
denote any time-varying unobserved shocks to the child or family. Using this notation, a general
model for child outcome yia as a function of the child's family characteristics and income history is
yia = fa(xi; wi0; :::; wia; Ii0; :::; Iia; i; "ia). For empirical purposes, it is useful to simplify the child
outcome equation as follows:
yia = x
0
ia + w
0
ia + Iia0 + Ii;a 11 + :::+ Ii;a LL + i + "ia; (1)
assuming that the eects of income on child achievement last for L years.6
To focus on the role of income, equation (1) abstracts from the eects of past time-varying
characteristics; however, these can easily be incorporated in the same way as past income. Equation
(1) also abstracts from the possibility that income has dierent eects at dierent ages (i.e. eects
depend only on the time elapsed between when income is earned and when child achievement is
measured) or at dierent points in the income distribution (i.e. linearity in income is assumed).
We explore these issues empirically below.
The specication in equation (1) allows for dierent eects of permanent characteristics at all
ages (i.e. a). In our empirical analysis, we allow xi characteristics (e.g. race, gender, and age of the
child) to aect both the level and growth of child achievement. Taking rst-dierences of equation
(1) to eliminate the unobserved xed eect i yields:
yia = x
0
i+w
0
ia +Iia0 +Ii;a 11 + :::+Ii;a LL +"ia; (2)
6One commonly used achievement model assumes that current achievement depends on current income and lagged
achievement (e.g. yia = x
0
ia + wia + Iia + yi;a 1 + i + "ia). Recursively substituting in for lagged values of
achievement on the right hand side yields a specication very similar to equation (1) in which all lagged income
measures and other time varying characteristics would also be included.
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where   a   a 1 is the eect of xi on achievement growth (assumed to be age invariant).
A common achievement specication in the child development literature assumes that there are
only contemporaneous eects of family income on children, ignoring any long-run eects. That is,
L = 0 in equations (1) and (2), which yields the following estimating equation in rst-dierences:
yia = x
0
i+w
0
ia +Iia0 +"ia: (3)
This `contemporaneous eects' model serves as our baseline and receives empirical support in our
analysis. It is dicult empirically to estimate more general models which allow prior income in
every year since birth to aect child outcomes. However, we also estimate specications which
allow one and two year lags.
3.2 Using Changes in the EITC to Estimate the Eects of Income
The primary concern with least squares estimation of the models above is the possibility that
changes in unobserved factors aecting child development (i.e. "ia) are correlated with changes
in family income. More generally, "ia may be correlated with the entire history of income levels
given the strong intertemporal correlation of income and its tendency for regression to the mean.
To address this problem, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) estimation strategy that takes
advantage of major changes in the EITC to estimate the eects of income on children. To simplify
the discussion, we focus on the `contemporaneous eects' model of equation (3); however, we take
a similar approach in estimating the more general model implied by equation (2), which allows for
lasting eects of income on children. (See the Appendix.)
We use total net family income (inclusive of EITC payments and net of other federal and state
taxes and transfers) as our measure of total family income, Iia. EITC income, 
sia
a (Pia), is a
function of pre-tax income, Pia, for the year when child i is age a. We also take into account
other taxes,  siaa (Pia). While the EITC and tax schedules do not generally vary with the child's
age in any given year, they do sometimes change over time as the child ages. We exploit this time
variation, referencing dierent years by age of the child, a. The superscript sia on the EITC and
tax functions denotes which schedule a child's family is on; the EITC schedules only dier based
the number of children in the household, while the more general tax function depends on a broader
set of family characteristics.7 Therefore, total net family income is given by
Iia = Pia + 
sia
a (Pia)   siaa (Pia):
7Our empirical analysis takes many additional income and tax distinctions into account; we ignore them here for
expositional purposes. See the Appendix.
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Central to our analysis is the variation in EITC schedules over time and the way in which EITC
expansions have dierentially augmented the incomes of dierent families.
Our IV estimation strategy builds on that of Gruber and Saez (2002) by assuming that changes
in the EITC structure are independent of idiosyncratic family circumstances.8 As an instrument
for Iia in estimating equation (3), we use
IVa (Pi;a 1)  si;a 1a (E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1])  si;a 1a 1 (Pi;a 1);
where E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1] is an estimate of pre-tax income given lagged pre-tax income. In practice, we
regress pre-tax income on an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income and a fth-order poly-
nomial in lagged pre-tax income when calculating E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1]. This eectively yields predicted
changes in EITC income as a function of lagged pre-tax income, taking into account the fact that
income evolves over time in a predictable way and that the EITC schedule changes in some years.9
By holding xed the type of EITC schedule (1 vs. 2+ children) si;a 1 in generating our instrument,
we only exploit variation in predicted EITC income due to government changes in EITC schedules
over time and not due to changes in family structure.
Of course, simply estimating equation (3) using IVa as an instrument is likely to yield biased
estimates for 0, since changes in families' simulated EITC payments are a function of age a 1 pre-
tax family income (Pi;a 1), which is likely to be correlated with the subsequent change in income
due to such factors as measurement error, regression to the mean, and serially correlated income
shocks. Therefore, based on the insight of Gruber and Saez (2002), we augment the outcome
equation with a exible function of Pi;a 1 when instrumenting. Letting (Pi;a 1) reect a exible
function of lagged pre-tax income, we estimate
yia = x
0
i+w
0
ia +Iia0 +(Pi;a 1) + ia (4)
using IVa as an instrument for Iia. Empirically, we employ the same functional form for
(Pi;a 1) as we use in estimating E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1]: we include an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax
income and a fth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. This ensures that the variation
8This strategy is loosely related to Feldstein (1995) and Currie and Gruber (1996), who use the eects of policy
changes on economy-wide aggregates rather than the distributional consequences of policy changes to identify their
parameters of interest. See Mott and Wilhelm (2000) for a general discussion of the simulated IV methodology and
its application.
9The ideal (i.e. most ecient) instrument would be E[
si;a 1
a (Pi;a)jPi;a 1]   si;a 1a 1 (Pi;a 1). In practice, age a
EITC income is dicult to predict based on lagged income due to non-linearity and discontinuities in the EITC
schedule. An intuitive approach would simply use lagged pre-tax income Pi;a 1 in place of E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1] in creating
our instrument. This strategy (when incorporating the control function as discussed below) yields consistent but
much less precise estimates compared to the approach taken here.
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in our instrument used to identify 0 comes from changes in the EITC schedule and not from
the level of lagged pre-tax income. Intuitively, this strategy estimates the extent to which the
dierential income boosts associated with the EITC expansions (as determined by past income
levels) are met with increases in child achievement. If income has a positive eect on achievement,
we should observe greater increases in test scores among children from low-income families relative
to high-income families when the EITC expands.10
One can think of the polynomial (Pi;a 1) in equation (4) as a control function. It is, therefore,
important that () be exible enough to capture the true expected relationship between child
development shocks and lagged pre-tax income | we use a very exible polynomial in lagged pre-
tax income. In the most general case, the control function should equal E["iajPi;a 1; xi;wia].
As such, if the evolution of income over time diers systematically with xi or wia or if the
relationship between "ia and pre-tax income depends on xi or wia, then the control function
should be generalized to account for these relationships. Recognizing this possibility, we consider
alternative specications using a more general control function that interacts (Pi;a 1) with all xi
and wia regressors.
11
Our approach relies on one fundamental assumption: the relationship between child develop-
ment shocks and lagged pre-tax income must be stable over time. In using a time invariant control
function (), our baseline analysis implicitly assumes that the relationship between "ia and pre-
tax income does not vary with time over our sample period. To relax this assumption, we explore
additional specications that allow the control function to evolve smoothly over time or to vary
state by state in response to changes in state welfare or school accountability policies. However, it
is not possible to allow the control function to vary freely over time, since this would eliminate any
independent variation in our instrument IVa (Pi;a 1).
With a fully exible (time invariant) control function, all identication comes from dierential
changes in the EITC schedule over time. Our strategy would break down if the EITC schedule
did not change during our sample period, since there would be no independent variation in our
instrument given the control function (Pi;a 1). In fact, our approach requires at least three periods
of data, since we need at least two dierent changes in the EITC schedule over time given a exible
10Figure 1b makes clear that the largest changes in our instrument occur for low to moderate income families. If
E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1] = Pi;a 1, then the value of the instrument over time (as a function of pre-tax income) would be as
illustrated in Figure 1b. However, for very low earnings families, E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1] > Pi;a 1 since their earned income
is predicted to rise. The time invariant control function accounts for the fact that the value of the instrument varies
by income even when the EITC schedule does not change. As discussed below, our approach requires that the EITC
schedule itself must change over time to identify the eect of income on child achievement.
11The Appendix provides a more detailed discussion of these issues. See Heckman and Robb (1985) for a general
treatment of control functions. Linear spline functions yield similar results to those presented in the paper.
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control function. To better understand identication, suppose that income did not change at all
over time. In this case, any changes in after-tax income would be driven solely by changes in the
EITC schedule. The validity of our research design, therefore, hinges on controlling exibly for
pre-tax income with the control function. The fact that we use lagged pre-tax income is second
order.
Two minor practical issues arise in our analysis. First, the vast majority of EITC recipients
receive their credit after ling their taxes the following year. Therefore, we link test scores (typically
measured sometime between March and December in our data) with income earned in the previous
calendar year (reported during the same survey as test scores are recorded), referring to them as
`contemporaneous'. Second, we only observe child achievement scores every other year as we discuss
further below. Thus, we use two-year dierences rather than one-year dierences in our analysis.
The Appendix briey describes how this aects the estimating equations above.
4 Data
We use data from the Children of the NLSY and the main NLSY sample of mothers. These data
are ideal for studying the eects of family income on children for several reasons. First, we can link
children to their mothers, and second, we can follow families over time. Third, the NLSY contains
repeated measures of various child outcomes and comprehensive measures of family income. Finally,
the NLSY oversamples minority families, which provides a larger sample of families eligible for the
EITC. We exclude children from the oversamples of poor white families and military families.
The NLSY collects a rich set of variables for both children and mothers repeatedly over time,
allowing us to estimate models with child xed eects. For children, biennial measures of family
background and cognitive achievement are available from 1986 to 2000. Detailed longitudinal
demographic, educational, and labor market information for the mothers is available annually from
1979 through 1994 and biennially thereafter. Equally important, family income measures (for the
previous calendar year) are available in all survey years for the mothers up to 1994 and biennially
thereafter. The survey reports many components of family income, which we aggregate into three
categories of pre-tax/EITC income: earned income, unearned income, and non-taxable income.
See the Online Appendix for a description of these income categories and how we impute missing
observations.
While the NLSY contains a broad array of income questions, it does not ask an individual how
much they received in EITC payments or paid in taxes. Both the IRS (2002) and Scholz (1994)
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estimate that roughly 80 to 87 percent of eligible households receive the credit. We implicitly assume
full take-up and impute each family's state and federal EITC payment and tax burden using the
TAXSIM program (version 9) maintained by Daniel Feenberg and the NBER (see Feenberg and
Coutts, 1993 and http://www.nber.org/taxsim).
In our analysis, we focus on measures of scholastic achievement in math and reading based on
standardized scores on Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT). The assessments measure
ability in mathematics, oral reading and word recognition ability (reading recognition), and the
ability to derive meaning from printed words (reading comprehension). From 1986 to 2000, the
tests were administered biennially to children ages ve and older; although, 92% of our estimation
sample is between the ages of 8 and 14. Children took each individual test at most ve times due
to the age restrictions. See the Online Appendix for details.
To make the PIAT test scores more easily interpretable, we create normalized test scores with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one based on the random sample of test takers (i.e. exclud-
ing the poor, military, and minority oversamples). We also create a combined math-reading score,
which takes the average of our normalized math and reading scores. This is then re-normalized
to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in the random sample. Our full sample
that includes oversamples of blacks and hispanics has negative average normalized test scores, since
children in the oversamples are more disadvantaged on average.
We restrict our main sample to children observed in at least two consecutive (even-numbered)
survey years between 1988 and 2000 with valid PIAT scores, family background characteristics,
and family income measures, since our primary analysis estimates models with child xed eects.12
Because changes in family income are likely to mean something very dierent when there is a
change of marital status relative to when there is not, we also limit our sample to children whose
mothers did not change marital status during two-year intervals when test scores are measured. Our
main sample includes 4,412 interviewed children born to 2,401 interviewed mothers, with children
observed 2.2 times on average. Table 1 provides information on family income and EITC eligibility
over time for this main sample. The table reveals that median after-tax family income rose in
real terms from $23,463 reported in 1988 to $38,390 reported in 2000. The time trend in family
income, which outpaced ination, is largely attributable to the aging of mothers in the sample. The
12We exclude the 1986 survey year and survey years 2002 onward to focus our analysis on changes in the EITC,
rather than the large changes in the tax code associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the two `Bush' tax
cuts in 2001 and 2003. To focus on EITC changes, we also exclude observations with family income levels above
$100,000; although, including these observations has negligible eects. To minimize the inuence of outliers and
obvious measurement error, we also trim observations with very large changes in income or large and unusual changes
in reported welfare income. See the Online Appendix for details.
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relevance of changes in the EITC schedule over time is also evident in Table 1. Roughly one-third
of children live in families which qualify for the EITC, a high rate that is partly due to the NLSY
oversampling of minorities. The largest EITC expansion is reected in the sizeable increase in
EITC eligibility and payment amounts for 2+ child families between 1994 and 1996.
Table A1 in the Appendix describes sample characteristics based on EITC eligibility. Panel A
lists variables for the child that are included as controls in our baseline `dierence' specications:
child gender, age, number of siblings, and race. Panel B includes additional variables used as
controls in our OLS `levels' regressions and a robustness specication. These include mother's
characteristics like age, completed education, AFQT score, and whether she lived with both natural
parents at age 14. It also includes the mother's marital status in the previous year (corresponding
to the year income is measured), household composition variables, spouse's age, and education
measures of the mother's parents and spouse.
Column (i) provides summary statistics for our full sample. The average age of the children
in our sample is 11 and most children have at least one sibling. Over half the sample is black
or hispanic due to the oversampling of minorities. The average age of mothers is 33 years old,
although the youngest mother with a child in our sample is 25. Columns (ii) and (iii) in Table
A1 break down the summary statistics based on EITC eligibility, while column (iv) reports the
dierence between eligible and ineligible families. Children from EITC eligible families (relative
to those that are ineligible) are more likely to be minorities and have mothers with less education
and lower AFQT scores. Their parents are also less likely to be married. These dierences suggest
that some children will be more directly aected by changes in the generosity of the EITC (e.g.
black children with unmarried, low educated mothers versus white children with married, highly
educated mothers).
5 The Eect of Income on Cognitive Achievement
In this section, we discuss the estimated impact of family income on children's math and reading
achievement. We rst report standard OLS and dierenced estimates of outcome equations (1)
and (2) under dierent assumptions about the dynamic eects of income. We also briey discuss
estimates for a few additional specications previously employed in the literature. We then turn
to our IV estimation strategy, which accounts for measurement error, permanent unobserved het-
erogeneity, and temporary unobserved shocks. We explore whether income changes have lasting
eects on child achievement, whether the eects vary across dierent demographic groups, and
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whether income dierentially aects younger versus older children. To establish the robustness
of our ndings, we examine a number of dierent specications, including regressions which ac-
count for time-varying state policies, more general control functions, and maternal labor market
participation.
5.1 OLS and Dierenced Estimates
We begin by presenting OLS and dierenced estimates of the eects of family income on our
combined math-reading measure of cognitive achievement. As a reminder, the dierenced estimates
are based on two-year dierences, since children are only administered the PIAT tests every other
year. Compared to most studies, we estimate more general models of child achievement, exploring
whether income has lasting eects on children.
Table 2 reports estimates of equations (1) and (2) under dierent assumptions about the per-
sistence of income eects. In the levels models we regress child achievement on total income and
include all the variables reported in Table A1 as controls. The specication we estimate in dier-
ences is slightly more general, since we allow achievement growth to vary by the child characteristics
listed in panel A of Table A1. Column (i) assumes the `contemporaneous eects' model used by
many previous studies. Estimated in levels, we nd that a $1,000 increase in family income raises
math-reading test scores by 0.005 standard deviations. Estimated in dierences, the eect is less
than one-fourth as large and no longer signicant. These estimates are similar to corresponding
estimates in Blau (1999).
There are two reasons to expect a discrepancy between dierence (or xed eects) and cross-
sectional OLS estimates. First, measurement error is greater for income measured in dierences
than in levels, so attenuation bias will be greater for dierence estimators. Second, a correlation
between unobserved xed eects (i) and family income will bias cross-sectional OLS estimates.
The rst bias is greater for dierence estimates while the second only aects cross-sectional OLS,
so there is no a priori reason to prefer one type of estimator over the other. More importantly,
both approaches suer from additional bias if unobserved transitory shocks to families and children
are correlated with family income.
Columns (ii)-(iv) estimate more general models that allow for the possibility that income eects
persist for up to two years into the future. Column (iii) reveals the diculty in identifying the
persistence of income eects beyond one year due to the high degree of collinearity in earnings
over time. To improve precision but still allow for a dierence between contemporaneous and past
income, column (iv) imposes 1 = 2 but allows for a separate eect of contemporaneous income,
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0. The levels specications in Panel A suggest that income eects are quite small and may last for
a few years, while dierence estimates in Panel B suggest even smaller eects for current and lagged
income. For both panels, we also report the implied medium-term eects of increasing income by
$1,000 each year for up to three years. This is simply the sum of the estimated eects of current
and lagged income. These are quite modest and similar across columns (ii)-(iv), and suggest that
the coecient in column (i) understates the medium-run eect of a sustained increase in income.
An alternative specication often seen in the literature regresses child achievement on a long-
run average of family income (generally averaging over all available income measures from the
past, present, and future). This specication is economically motivated by the standard lifecycle
or permanent income model, which assumes family investments in children depend on lifetime
or `permanent' income rather than income in any particular period. Implicit is the assumption
that families can borrow and save in order to smooth their consumption and child investments
over time. A separate statistical argument can also be made for regressing child achievement on
average income rather than income received in any particular period. Because income is measured
with error, standard OLS level and dierenced estimators will tend to be biased towards zero, and
averaging may alleviate this problem. In practice, previous studies tend to estimate larger eects of
average income than of current income (e.g. Blau 1999). We nd the same pattern: the relationship
between long-run average income and test scores is 70% larger compared to the relationship between
current income and achievement. One concern with using average long-run family income is the
diculty in accounting for unobserved long-run heterogeneity using xed eects strategies. Since
average family income is likely to be more strongly correlated with unobserved family characteristics
than is income for any particular period, estimates using long-run averages of family income may
be subject to greater omitted variable bias.
5.2 IV Estimates
We now turn to our IV approach to estimate the eects of family income on child achievement. We
begin with our simple `contemporaneous eects' model in dierences (equation 3) using simulated
changes in the EITC (based on lagged income) as instruments for changes in actual after-tax/EITC
total family income. As a practical matter, identication comes primarily from the substantial
expansion of the EITC schedule between 1993 and 1995; however, other smaller changes in the EITC
schedule also aid in identication. The approach reveals whether achievement scores systematically
increased more for families who were predicted to receive a greater boost in EITC payments during
years when the schedule expanded.
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Our approach requires inclusion of a exible function of lagged pre-tax income as detailed in
equation (4). We explored dierent ordered polynomials and found the estimates to be very similar
for orders four and above if we also include an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income. To
be conservative, we use a fth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income and an indicator for
positive lagged pre-tax income as our baseline `control function'. Our baseline specication allows
for dierential growth in achievement based on a child's gender, age, number of siblings, and
race. Below, we show that the results are similar for specications with additional controls (i.e.
other factors aecting growth in test scores) and with more general control functions that interact
included regressors with the polynomial in income.
Table 3 reports baseline IV estimates for our combined math-reading achievement measure, as
well as each of the individual PIAT subject test measures. The results in column (i) imply that a
$1,000 increase in family income raises math-reading achievement by 6% of a standard deviation,
a modest eect, but much larger than the comparable OLS estimates in column (i) of Table 2.13
To place this estimate in perspective, in the OLS levels specication, having a mother who is
a high school graduate (versus a high school dropout) is associated with an increase of 17% of a
standard deviation in achievement. Looking at columns (ii) { (iv) in Table 3, the estimated eects of
income are noticeably lower for reading recognition, while the estimated eects of income on reading
comprehension and math are similar to the eects for our combined math-reading measure.
This table also reports the coecient on our instrument in the rst stage regression of changes
in total family income on changes in predicted EITC receipt. It is slightly larger than one, but not
signicantly so. In general, this coecient may deviate from one due to labor supply responses to
the EITC expansions or due to measurement error in income. As we discuss later in the paper, we
nd some evidence of a modest eect operating through labor supply.
The key assumption in our analysis is that the relationship between child achievement growth
and lagged pre-tax income should be relatively stable over time if the EITC schedule is not changing.
Identication relies on linking changes in the income { achievement relationship with changes in
the EITC schedule over time. Of particular concern are systematic economic or policy changes that
would improve the test scores of children from lower-income families at the same time the EITC
expanded (most notably from 1993 to 1995). In this case, our IV estimators would mistakenly
13Since we use two-year dierences in income and child outcomes, these estimates reect the eects of increasing
annual income by $1,000 for up to two years. As we show below with dynamic achievement specications, these
estimates largely identify the impact of increasing income in the current year by $1,000, since earlier increases in
income appear to have small lasting eects. The estimates could also be inated by about 15-20% to account for the
fact that EITC take-up rates are estimated to range from 80 to 87% (IRS 2002, Scholz 1994).
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attribute the achievement gains of disadvantaged children to the increased income their families
received from expansions of the EITC. We explore specications in Table 4 that take into account
national time trends and changes in state-level school accountability and welfare policies. To
conserve space, we only report estimates for our combined math-reading achievement measure.
The rst specication in Table 4 includes year dummies in our baseline specication. This allows
average test scores to vary freely from year to year, and forces identication of our IV estimate
to come entirely from dierences in predicted EITC changes across individuals (by lagged pre-tax
income) between any two years.14 This yields a similar point estimate (signicant at the 0.10 level)
to that of Table 3, but the standard error increases by two-thirds. Specications B and C in the
table allow for a linear time trend in test score growth; specication C also interacts the time trend
with the control function (Pi;a 1) (i.e. the polynomial in lagged pre-tax income and an indicator
for positive lagged pre-tax income). These specications yield larger (and less precise) estimates
when compared with our baseline estimate in Table 3. By interacting the time trend with the
control function, we address the concern that the relationship between child outcomes and pre-tax
income is changing over time.
The next two specications in Table 4 address changes in state policies that might directly aect
the relationship between child outcomes and family income or characteristics: school accountability
policies and welfare regulations. A few states began to introduce student testing/accountability
measures and welfare reforms in the early 1990s, which some studies have linked to improvements in
state test scores (e.g. Hanushek and Raymond (2005) and Miller and Zhang (2008)).15 To account
for these reforms, we add an annual indicator for whether the child's state has a `consequential'
accountability policy (i.e. required testing with consequences for school performance) to our base-
line specication. The next specication examines whether accounting for welfare reforms taking
place in the 1990s (associated with statewide AFDC waivers and TANF) aects our results. This
specication includes an annual indicator equal to one if a state has any of the following: (a) time
limits on welfare receipt, (b) sanctions for violating work requirements, or (c) school requirements
for dependent children. (These specications also include interactions between accountability or
welfare reform and the control function.) As Table 4 shows, these additions have little aect on
14Without time dummies, our estimates are identied even if everyone experienced the same predicted EITC
change between years as long as the EITC expanded more in some years than others. Our IV specications that do
not include time dummies are identied from changes in average EITC income and test scores over time as well as
dierential changes in EITC income and test scores across individuals between particular time periods.
15Most states did not introduce school accountability policies or welfare reforms prior to 1996. A number of
states received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) waivers in the early 1990s; however, most states
introduced welfare reforms with the introduction of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program
in 1996. See the Online Appendix for a detailed description of our school accountability and welfare policy measures.
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our estimates. Finally, the last specication of Table 4 simultaneously accounts for national time
trends, state-level school accountability, and state-welfare reforms. The results are nearly identical
to our baseline estimates (with larger standard errors). In summary, we nd no evidence that
time-varying policies or economic changes materially aect the estimated impacts of family income
on child achievement.
In Table 5, we return to dynamic models of child achievement that allow for lasting eects
of family income on children. We report estimates for the combined math-reading achievement
measure analogous to those of Table 2. Due to the limited number of major changes in the EITC
schedule, we only estimate the eects of income lasting up to two years into the future. These
specications instrument for lagged income changes, including the appropriate control function,
using a similar approach to that used for the contemporaneous eects model (see the Appendix for
details). Columns (i) and (ii) allow for the possibility that income aects test scores up to one or
two years later. Both specications suggest sizeable eects of contemporaneous income and eects
of past income which are smaller. Given the sizeable standard errors when multiple years of income
are included, column (iii) restricts both one- and two-year lagged income to have the same eect
(i.e. 1 = 2). This specication provides more precise estimates, but yields the same conclusion:
contemporaneous income plays an important role in achievement, with smaller eects from past
income.16 The table also reports the implied medium-term eects of a sustained increase in income
for up to three years. These medium-term eects are up to 50% larger than the contemporaneous
eect estimated in Table 3.
We draw two main conclusions from Table 5. First, there are small, but statistically insignicant,
eects of lagged income on math and reading achievement scores. The medium-term eects suggest
that our baseline estimates in Table 3, if anything, understate the eects of lasting income changes
on child achievement. Second, income appears to have important contemporaneous eects on child
achievement. Moreover, incorporating lasting eects of income does not substantially alter the fact
that income has a sizeable contemporaneous eect. So, while one would certainly like to more
fully determine the dynamic eects of family income on achievement, the simple `contemporaneous
eects' model appears to provide reasonably good estimates of the short-run eects of income. We
focus on this baseline model in the remaining two tables.
Table 6 displays estimates from separate regressions for various population subgroups. Esti-
mates in the table reect the impact of a $1,000 increase in current income on combined math and
16A number of recent studies estimate similarly strong fade-out eects for the `value added' of individual teachers
on student test scores (e.g. Lockwood, et al. 2007, Jacob, Lefgren and Sims 2008, and Rothstein 2008).
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reading achievement for the reported subgroups. The extent to which dierent subgroups are more
or less aected by changes in the EITC is reected in the `Percent in EITC Range' for each group.
Higher socioeconomic status (SES) groups have a lower probability of being aected by the EITC
and, therefore, a smaller instrumented change in income on average. This is reected in the fact
that the rst stage estimates for high SES groups typically have standard errors that are twice as
large as those for low SES groups.
Except for the nal two columns, the table is organized such that estimates for more economi-
cally disadvantaged groups are reported at the top while estimates for more advantaged groups are
at the bottom. Achievement for children with low educated mothers increases signicantly with
income, while achievement for children whose mothers attended at least some college is largely un-
responsive to income changes. One should exercise caution in interpreting the latter, however, since
the rst stage is quite weak for children with more educated mothers. Changes in EITC schedules
do not provide a very good source of income variation for these families. We also estimate strong
and statistically signicant eects of family income on the achievement of minority children; in
contrast, our estimates for whites are substantially smaller and the rst stage is imprecise. Point
estimates also suggest that income raises test scores more among children in unmarried households
relative to married households, and more for children whose mother's AFQT score is below the me-
dian compared to above the median; however, these estimates are fairly imprecise. Overall, these
estimates suggest that the eects of family income are greater for more disadvantaged children;
although, the dierence is only statistically signicant by maternal education.
A number of recent studies (e.g. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997, Duncan, et al. 1998, Levy
and Duncan 1999) suggest that income at early ages may have greater eects on development than
income received at later ages. In the second to last column of Table 6, we estimate the eects of
income separately for children age 11 or younger versus age 12 or older. These estimates suggest
slightly larger eects of income on achievement for younger children, although the dierence is not
statistically signicant. Unfortunately, we are unable to examine the eects of income at very early
ages, which is when many researchers nd the largest eects. This is because most children in our
sample (92% of the children) are ages 8 through 14 when they take the PIAT tests.17
In the nal column of Table 6, we estimate separate models for boys versus girls. The eect of
income for boys is twice as large as that for girls, although the standard errors are large enough
17One of the PIAT components (reading recognition) initially had problems which invalidated test scores for many
young children. Using the average of the math and reading comprehension tests only, which includes all children
beginning at age ve, we nd a similar pattern by age: the estimated eect of income is 0.062 (s.e.=0.032) for children
age 11 or younger and 0.033 (s.e.=0.022) for children age 12 or older.
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that the dierence is not statistically signicant. This result is similar to that found by Milligan
and Stabile (2009), who nd that increased child benet levels in Canada had stronger eects on
the academic performance of boys compared to girls.
Table 7 presents several additional specications for the `contemporaneous eects' model (com-
bined math-reading measure) to explore the robustness of our baseline results. Specication A in-
cludes additional control variables such as the mother's age and education, her family background,
and her spouse's characteristics in the dierenced child outcome equation, while specication B
removes all control variables (except the control function) from our baseline specication. Neither
change in control variables has much impact on the estimated eect of family income. We next
explore a more general control function in specication C, interacting all of the baseline control
variables with lagged pre-tax income and the polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. These interac-
tions address the concern that the relationship between child outcomes and lagged income diers
based on the baseline controls. This more general control function does not appreciably change the
estimate.
Our estimates exploit variation in both state and federal EITC schedules when constructing
our instruments. Specication D shows that the inclusion of state xed eects in our specications
has little impact on the coecient of interest. This is true regardless of whether we use the state
EITCs to construct our instruments. Because few states had EITC provisions during our sample
period (5 states by 1996 and 10 states by 1999), the results are very similar when only using federal
changes in EITC schedules to construct our instruments.
Specication E in Table 7 uses NLSY-created weights for the initial sample of mothers to weight
observations. These estimates indicate a slightly smaller eect of family income on achievement;
however, the standard error is 12% larger than that of our baseline estimates without weights.18
Table 6 suggests that the eects of income may be stronger for more disadvantaged children.
Under this assumption, some researchers have preferred to measure income in logs rather than
levels. For comparison and as a check on the robustness of our ndings, specication F of Table 7
18Two arguments are often made for using sampling weights. First, they can produce more ecient estimates.
However, this is not generally true in the case of IV estimation and does not appear to be true in our application
based on a comparison of standard errors. A second argument sometimes made for using sampling weights is based on
heterogeneous `treatment eects' and the desire for estimating a population average eect. Since blacks and hispanics
are over-represented in our sample, one might want to use sampling weights to obtain a population `average' eect of
family income on achievement. However, IV does not generally yield a population average eect, except in rare cases
(see, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil 1998, Imbens and Angrist 1994, Wooldridge 1997). In our context, estimates using
the sampling weights should place a larger weight on the eect for whites vs. minorities. Thus, the slightly smaller
estimate for specication D relative to our baseline estimate in Table 3 is consistent with the nding in Table 6 that
income eects are larger for minorities than for whites.
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uses log total family income as the right-hand side variable rather than income measured in levels.19
This specication implies that a 10% increase in family income raises achievement by 6.4% of a
standard deviation. For families with income of $12,000, an extra $1,000 would raise child math-
reading scores by 0.053 of a standard deviation, similar to our baseline IV estimate that uses income
measured in levels.
It is natural to question whether the large changes in the EITC generated important labor supply
responses among mothers which may have aected children separately from the direct eects of
income we aim to measure. In principle, an EITC expansion may aect children in three ways. First,
holding earnings constant, it increases family income. Second, it may aect earnings through family
labor supply responses. Both of these aect children through available family resources. Finally,
labor supply responses may directly aect children through parental time spent with children. If
labor supply responses to EITC schedule changes are small, the second and third eects will be
negligible, and our baseline estimates identify only the rst eect. More generally, we can identify
the eect of total income changes (i.e. the sum of the rst two eects) by controlling for labor
supply.
Most empirical studies nd very small negative eects of the EITC expansions on hours worked
by women who were already working. The literature also nds a positive eect on labor market
participation among single mothers, but small negative eects on married mothers with working
husbands (see Hotz and Scholz 2003 and Eissa and Hoynes 2005). Specication G of Table 7
adds changes in maternal labor force participation and hours worked to our baseline specications
as additional controls. An increase in the number of hours a mother works has small negative
estimated eects on children, whereas participation changes have statistically insignicant eects.
Most importantly, accounting for changes in mother's labor market participation and hours of work
does not aect our main conclusion about the importance of family income.20
Recall that total income increased by $1.27 for a $1 increase in predicted EITC payments in
the rst stage of the baseline specication. The fact that the coecient is slightly larger than one
(although not signicantly so) is consistent with a modest bonus impact through increased labor
19In this specication, we use ln

E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1] + si;a 1a

E^[Pi;ajPi;a 1]

  ln(Pi;a 1   si;a 1a 1 (Pi;a 1)) as an
instrument for ln(Iia).
20The endogeneity of which mothers work and how much they choose to work is an obvious concern. We attempted
to treat participation as endogenous by using changing parameters of the EITC schedules (e.g. maximum credit
amounts, phase-in and phase-out rates) over time as additional instrumental variables for maternal labor market
participation (an approach similar in spirit to Blundell, et. al 1998, and Eissa and Hoynes 2006). This approach
yields statistically signicant estimates for family income that are very similar to our baseline estimates; however, it
produces imprecise estimates for maternal labor force participation. Unfortunately, the rst stage for maternal labor
supply indicates the instruments are weak in our sample.
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supply. Indeed, once labor supply is controlled for in panel G, the rst stage coecient drops to
0.90.
5.3 Interpreting IV Estimates
Our IV results indicate modest but encouraging eects of family income on children's scholastic
achievement. Our baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in income raises combined math
and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation. Although modest in an absolute sense,
our estimates are large relative to much of the literature and relative to the OLS and dierenced
estimates reported in Table 2. Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues (2007) also report IV estimates of
the eect of family income on child achievement that are much larger than their OLS estimates.
Their IV strategy exploits randomly assigned variation in family income supplements from ten
dierent income support and welfare experiments to identify the causal eect of income. Looking
at expansions in the Canadian child benet program, Milligan and Stabile (2009) nd even larger
eects of extra income on children's test scores than we do. Like our approach, these two papers
use exogenous variation in income and focus on relatively disadvantaged families.
We speculate that a variety of factors may be responsible for our larger IV estimates relative to
traditional OLS and xed eects or dierenced estimates. A rst possibility is that measurement
error produces attenuation bias for standard methods. Fixed eects and dierenced estimators are
particularly aected by this problem, since changes in income are noisier than income measured in
levels. However, measurement error alone is unlikely to explain most of the gap between our IV
estimates and more traditional estimates. As reported in Section 5.1, the estimated eect of average
income (which should have less measurement error) is 70% larger compared to the estimated eect
of contemporaneous income in OLS specications (0.0080 versus 0.0047) but still much smaller
than our IV estimates.
A second potential explanation is that income matters more for disadvantaged families and that
our IV estimates capture the eects of income for disadvantaged families who are aected by the
EITC expansions. Table 6 oers some support for this explanation. Furthermore, Lken, Mogstad
and Wiswall (2010) argue that nonlinear eects explain why OLS and FE estimators nd little
evidence that family income matters, since these estimates place relatively little weight on poor
families in most studies. To further explore this issue, we split the sample into low, middle, and
high average total family income groups and use OLS to estimate separate eects of income for
each group.21 The eect of a $1,000 increase in average income is 0.026 (s.e.=0.009) for the bottom
21Given the NLSY oversampling of minorities, our data contains a large number of low and moderate income
21
quartile, 0.010 (0.004) for the middle two quartiles combined, and 0.010 (0.004) for the highest
quartile. The eect for the lowest income group is much larger than the eects for higher income
groups and closer to our IV estimates.
A third explanation recognizes that each EITC expansion eectively raised the annual incomes
of eligible families for many years in the future. For example, we estimate that for the median EITC
recipient, the 1993-95 EITC expansion raised total credit amounts over the years 1995-99 by nearly
four times the amount it raised credit amounts in 1995 alone.22 If families are forward-looking
and base their investment decisions on current and expected future income, we would expect them
to respond more to a lasting change in income than to a one-year change. A lasting increase in
income is also likely to alleviate family stress and improve family dynamics more than a comparable
temporary increase. In this case, our IV estimator identies the eect of increasing annual income
by $1,000 for many years into the future and not just a single year. On the other hand, OLS and
dierence estimators identify the eect of a much more short-lived increase in income, since most of
the underlying variation in income over time is transitory (or measurement error). Thus, it is not
surprising that our IV estimates exceed our OLS and dierence estimators. See Dahl and Lochner
(2005) for a more formal discussion of these issues.
A nal possible explanation for larger IV estimates may have to do with the nature of EITC
income relative to other income sources. Three features of the EITC are somewhat special. First,
the EITC is typically paid out in lump sum fashion after families le their taxes (many EITC
recipients even receive an automatic refund at ling), and families may spend these lump-sum
transfers dierently than they spend more traditional income ows (Barrow and McGranahan
(2000) and Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan (2008)). Second, since EITC payments explicitly
depend on having children in the household, families may feel some obligation to spend it on
their children. Third, EITC payments come in the mail with tax returns or are direct deposited
into family accounts. As such, mothers may be more likely to gain control of EITC payments than
fathers (compared to other sources of income). A number of studies empirically nd that household
expenditures on children increase with the share of family income going to mothers (e.g. Lundberg,
Pollak, and Wales 1997, Attanasio and Lechene 2002, and Ward-Batts 2008).
families. The lowest quartile corresponds to families earning less than $18,031 on average, the middle two quartiles
between $18,031 and $41,790, and the fourth quartile greater than $41,790.
22To empirically investigate the persistence of EITC gains for families, we divide the cumulative three-year credit in-
crease (for 1995, 1997, and 1999) by the one-year credit increase for 1995 resulting from the large EITC expansion that
took place between 1993 and 1995. Specically, we calculate [95(P95)+95(P97)+95(P99)] [93(P95)+93(P97)+93(P99)]
95(P95) 93(P95) ,
where s(Pt) reects the simulated EITC credit based on the schedule from year s and pre-tax income reported for
year t. Extrapolating based on the median ratio implies that a $1 increase in current EITC income translates into a
$3.88 increase in EITC income over the next ve years.
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6 Conclusion
Understanding the consequences of growing up poor for a child's well-being is an important research
question, but one that is dicult to answer due to the potential endogeneity of family income. The
question is particularly interesting to policymakers, since part of the explicit rationale for income
support programs (such as the EITC) is to improve the lot of children. Past estimates of the eect
of family income on child development have often been plagued by omitted variable bias. That is,
children growing up in poor families are likely to have home environments or face other challenges
which would continue to aect development even if family income rose substantially.
In this paper, we use an IV strategy to estimate the causal eect of income on children's math
and reading achievement. Using a panel of 4,412 children matched to their mothers allows us to
address problems associated with both unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous transitory income
shocks. Our IV approach exploits the large non-linear changes in the EITC in the late 1980s and
1990s as an exogenous source of variation in family income levels. The largest of these EITC
changes doubled benet amounts for some families between 1993 and 1997, accounting for as much
as $2,100 in extra income (measured in year 2000$). Over the time period in our sample, the EITC
expansions raised average family income by more than 10% for EITC eligible families with two or
more children.
We nd that extra family income has a modest, but encouraging, causal eect for children
growing up in poor families. Our IV results indicate that current income has signicant eects
on a child's math and reading test scores. The baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in
income raises contemporaneous math and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation. Over
the entire sample period (1987{1999), the median EITC payment for eligible two-child families
increased by $1,670 (in year 2000$), implying an average test score increase of 10% of a standard
deviation for this group.
Our estimates also suggest that the eects are larger for children growing up in more disad-
vantaged families, younger children, and boys. The results are robust to a variety of alternative
specications, including regressions which account for time-varying state policies, general control
functions, and maternal labor market participation. Simple dynamic models suggest that contem-
poraneous income has the largest eect on achievement, with small eects from past income. An
interesting avenue for future research would be to explore why income has modest contemporaneous
eects but small long-run eects on achievement.
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Appendix: Methodological Issues
Details on EITC, Tax, and Net Total Income Measures
We create three family income categories based on the many income components in the NLSY:
earned income, unearned income, and non-taxable income. Earned income includes income from
wages and salary. Unearned income includes reported income from a business or farm, unemploy-
ment compensation, and a residual catch-all question referring to interest income, social security
payments, net rental income, and income from other regular sources. Non-taxable income includes
income from veteran benets, worker compensation or disability payments, welfare payments (in-
cluding food stamps, Supplementary Security Income, or other public assistance), and child support.
All of these measures include income received by the mother as well as her spouse. (Income from
unmarried partners is not included.)
To calculate actual EITC and tax amounts, we use both earned and unearned income, running
them through TAXSIM for the appropriate year.23 These are added (EITC) to and subtracted
(taxes) from pre-tax/EITC income to create our measure of total net family income, Iia. For our
sample period, federal EITC schedules only depend on whether there is one or more child in the
household. Other taxes depend on the number of children and marital status. We include state
taxes and transfers when constructing total family income. Excluding state EITC payments from
the instrument has little eect on the estimates, since there are few states with EITC programs
during our sample period.
To calculate predicted EITC amounts for use in our instruments, we only input earned in-
come (or predicted earned income) into TAXSIM. We do this because unearned income amounts
are generally quite low (and noisy) for persons otherwise qualifying for the EITC, and including
unearned income would require the inclusion of a more complicated control function used in IV
that depended on both earned and unearned income. The analysis is greatly simplied by leaving
unearned income out, with little sacriced in terms of identifying power.
IV Estimation of the Contemporaneous Eects Model
To understand the implicit assumptions underlying our IV strategy, begin by assuming that  =
 = 0 in equation (3). In this case, IV will provide consistent estimates if
Ea["iajPi;a 1;IVa ] = (Pi;a 1):
The a subscript on the expectation on the left reects that it is taken with respect to the age a
conditional distribution of "ia. The key assumptions underlying this approach are (i) the control
function () is exible enough to capture the true expected relationship between child development
shocks and pre-tax income, and (ii) the stability of that relationship over time.
First, notice that Ea["iajPi;a 1;IVa (Pi;a 1)] = Ea["iajPi;a 1] if factors aecting the EITC
schedule, sia, do not aect the relationship between shocks to child outcomes and pre-tax income. If
23While in later years persons with `excessive' interest and dividend income (above $2,200-2,500 depending on the
year) should be disqualied from the EITC, we are unable to separate this source of income from social security
payments, rental income or other regular sources of income. We eectively ignore this feature of the EITC rules.
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everyone was on the same schedule, this would be trivially satised since IVa would only be a func-
tion of pre-tax income. Endogeneity problems can be traced to the relationship between "ia and
(Pi;a 1; Pia). Stability of this relationship over time (i.e. Ea("iajPi;a 1; Pia) = E("iajPi;a 1; Pia)
so the expectation no longer depends on age, a) and stationarity of the income evolution pro-
cess (i.e. the joint distribution g(Pi;a 1; Pia) = g(Pi;a0 1; Pia0) for all a; a0) further implies that
Ea["iajPi;a 1] = E["iajPi;a 1] = (Pi;a 1) for a suciently exible function (). Note there is
nothing inherently special regarding the use of lagged pre-tax income in this approach; one could
reverse the roles played by current and lagged pre-tax income and include a exible function of
current income as the control function.
More generally, when  and  are not zero, one can incorporate xi and wia into the control
function. The estimates would then be consistent if
Ea["iajxi;wia; Pi;a 1;IVa ] = (xi;wia; Pi;a 1):
Estimating such a general control function can be empirically dicult due to the curse of dimension-
ality. Most of our regressors are indicator variables. In practice, we explore control functions with
high order polynomials in Pi;a 1 and interactions of those polynomials with all of our regressors.
In general, the inclusion of interaction terms has negligible eects on estimates of our parameters
of interest, and the simpler (Pi;a 1) is sucient.
IV Estimation of Models with Lasting Income Eects
Estimating more general rst-dierence models with lagged changes in income like equation (2) re-
quires additional instruments for each new income term. We use instruments analogous to those de-
scribed above. For example, when we estimate equation (2) using IV, we use 
si;a 1
a ` (E^[Pi;a `jPi;a 1]) 

si;a 1
a ` 1(E^[Pi;a ` 1jPi;a 1]) as an instrument for Ii;a `. It is still necessary to include the control
function (Pi;a 1), and the assumptions discussed above must still be satised. Notice, all sim-
ulated EITC changes are based on the schedule and pre-tax income level as of age a   1. This
maintains tractability, since it does not require inclusion of other lagged values of pre-tax income
in the control function (Pi;a 1). Using dierent lags of pre-tax income to simulate EITC changes
for each lag (e.g. using 
si;a 1
a ` (E^[Pi;a `jPi;a ` 1])  
si;a 1
a ` 1(Pi;a ` 1) as an instrument for Ii;a `)
would require including each year of lagged pre-tax income levels (used to create the instruments)
in the control function.
Estimating Equations using Two-Year Dierences
Our data only contain measures of child outcomes every other year; however, our model of child
outcomes (equation (1)) is based on annual income. We assume (1) describes child outcomes;
however, we estimate our models using two-period dierences. If we dene 2 to be the two-period
dierence operator (e.g. 2yia = yia   yi;a 2), then our model implies:
2yia = x
0
i+2w
0
ia +2Iia0 +2Ii;a 11 + :::+2Ii;a LL +2"ia: (20)
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We estimate versions of this equation for L = 0; 1; 2. While estimation of the `contemporaneous
eects' model (i.e. L = 0) does not require income data for years in-between when child outcome
measures are observed, estimation of other models does.
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Figure 1a: Federal EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children (Year 2000 Dollars)
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Figure 1b: Two-Year Changes in EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children
(Year 2000 Dollars)
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Table 1. Family Income, EITC Eligibility, and EITC Payments over Time (in Year 2000 $)
Fraction of EITC Payment as a
Children Fraction of Family
in EITC Median EITC Income (if Eligible)
Number of Median Lagged Eligible Payment 1 Child 2+ Child
Year Children Family Income Families (if Eligible) Families Families
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1988 1,187 23,463 0.31 547 0.05 0.05
1990 1,187 24,858 0.35 718 0.05 0.05
1992 1,648 26,852 0.31 833 0.06 0.06
1994 1,655 28,832 0.35 1,124 0.09 0.07
1996 1,682 34,988 0.34 1,917 0.10 0.13
1998 1,349 38,179 0.34 2,035 0.11 0.15
2000 1,088 38,390 0.34 2,226 0.11 0.16
All 9,796 30,501 0.34 1,129 0.08 0.10
Notes: Data are from the Children of the NLSY linked to their mothers in the main NLSY79. The
unit of observation is a child. The sample is restricted to those used in our baseline IV analysis in
Table 3. Children must have valid math and reading PIAT scores, child control measures in panel
A of Table A1, and family income measures for the reported year. Children must also have at least
two years of valid observations to be included. Year in column (i) refers to the NLSY survey year;
income and EITC payment variables refer to the previous year's income. Family income includes
tax payments and tax credits (including the EITC); the sources for family income include earned
income, unearned income, and non-taxable income.
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Eect of Family Income on Math-Reading Achievement
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
A. Estimated in Levels
Current Income 0.0047** 0.0031** 0.0022 0.0023
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Lagged Income (a-1) 0.0022 0.0019
(0.0016) (0.0024)
Lagged Income (a-2) 0.0015
(0.0019)
Sum of (a-1) and (a-2) Lagged Income 0.0017*
(0.0009)
Medium-Term Eect of Increasing 0.0047** 0.0053** 0.0056** 0.0056**
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015)
B. Estimated in Dierences
Current Income 0.0011 0.0015* 0.0011 0.0016*
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Lagged Income (a-1) 0.0005 0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0011)
Lagged Income (a-2) -0.0007
(0.0009)
Sum of (a-1) and (a-2) Lagged Income 0.0001
(0.0005)
Medium-Term Eect of Increasing 0.0010 0.0020* 0.0015 0.0018
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Sample Size (for both panels) 8,609 6,543 5,019 5,019
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Panel A `levels' regressions (equation 1) control for all variables listed
in Appendix Table A1. Panel B `dierence' regressions (equation 2) use two-period dierences and
control for baseline variables in Panel A of Table A1. Samples include children taking a math or
reading PIAT test in the 1988 survey year or later. `Medium-Term Eect' is given by the sum of
current and all estimated lagged income coecients in columns (i)-(iii) and the sum of the coecient
on current income plus twice the coecient on the sum of lagged income measures in column (iv).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Signicant at
the 5% level, *signicant at the 10% level.
Table 3: Baseline IV Estimates of `Contemporaneous Eects' Model
Combined Math Reading Reading
and Reading Recognition Comprehension Math
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Current Income 0.0610** 0.0359* 0.0613** 0.0582**
(0.0231) (0.0195) (0.0273) (0.0273)
1st Stage Coe. on Instrument 1.270** 1.270** 1.270** 1.270**
(0.381) (0.381) (0.381) (0.381)
Notes: Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specications control for `baseline
variables' listed in Appendix Table A1, an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income, and a fth
order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. All models are estimated in two-year dierences to
account for unobserved child xed eects. See the Online Appendix for all other rst- and second-
stage coecient estimates. Sample size is 8,609 for all the columns. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Signicant at the 5% level, *signicant at
the 10% level.
Table 4: IV Estimates of `Contemporaneous Eects' Model Accounting for Time Trends and
Time-Varying State Policies (Math-Reading Achievement)
Eect of Current 1st Stage Coe.
Income on Instrument
A. Year Dummies 0.0694* 0.745**
(0.0390) (0.348)
B. Linear Time Trend 0.0863** 0.847**
(0.0379) (0.334)
C. Linear Time Trend Interacted with Control Function 0.0805** 1.115**
(0.0399) (0.485)
D. State School Accountability Policies Interacted with 0.0533** 1.299**
Control Function (0.0221) (0.406)
E. State Welfare Policies Interacted with Control Function 0.0670** 1.311**
(0.0268) (0.436)
F. Time Trend, Accountability and Welfare Policies 0.0630* 1.193**
Interacted with Control Function (0.0338) (0.513)
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specications control for `baseline variables' listed in Appendix
Table A1. All specications are estimated in two-year dierences to account for unobserved child
xed eects. Sample size is 8,609 for all specications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the family level. **Signicant at the 5% level, *signicant at the 10% level.
Table 5: IV Estimates of Achievement Models with Lasting Income Eects
(i) (ii) (iii)
Current Income 0.0436* 0.0551 0.0515**
(0.0236) (0.0478) (0.0226)
Lagged Income (a-1) 0.0216 0.0135
(0.0408) (0.0733)
Lagged Income (a-2) 0.0206
(0.0381)
Sum of (a-1) and (a-2) Lagged Income 0.0186
(0.0254)
Medium-Term Eect of Increasing 0.0651* 0.0892 0.0888
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0349) (0.0604) (0.0598)
F-statistics from 1st Stage 6.17, 3.59 3.98, 1.39, 2.16 5.53, 1.77
Sample Size 6,543 5,019 5,019
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured in
$1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specications control for `baseline variables' listed in Appendix Table A1,
an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income, and a fth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. All
models are estimated in two-year dierences to account for unobserved child xed eects. `Medium-Term
Eect' is given by the sum of current and all estimated lagged income coecients in columns (i) and (ii) and
the sum of the coecient on current income plus twice the coecient on the sum of lagged income measures
in column (iii). F-statistics are for tests that all instruments equal zero in rst-stage equations. See the
Online Appendix for all other rst- and second-stage coecient estimates. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Signicant at the 5% level, *signicant at the 10% level.
Table 6. IV Estimates of `Contemporaneous Eects' Model for Various Subgroups
Mother's
Mother's Marital Mother's Child's Child's
Education Race Status AFQT Age Gender
High School Black or Not Low Age
or Less Hispanic Married AFQT < 12 Male
Eect of Current Income 0.0536** 0.0800** 0.0806* 0.0708** 0.0765* 0.0879**
(0.0211) (0.0304) (0.0463) (0.0340) (0.0436) (0.0446)
1st Stage Coe. 1.386** 1.281** 0.808** 1.089** 1.050** 1.056**
on Instrument (0.402) (0.428) (0.389) (0.433) (0.495) (0.472)
`Percent in EITC Range' 56.4 62.8 90.1 64.9 46.4 49.6
Sample Size 6,253 4,602 2,977 4,311 4,654 4,261
Some College White High Age
or More (not Hisp.) Married AFQT  12 Female
Eect of Current Income 0.0163 0.0146 0.0434* 0.0486 0.0516** 0.0399*
(0.0107) (0.0295) (0.0248) (0.0361) (0.0235) (0.0221)
1st Stage Coe. 0.086 1.265 2.153** 1.466* 1.460** 1.479**
on Instrument (1.123) (0.798) (0.907) (0.802) (0.452) (0.489)
`Percent in EITC Range' 30.8 34.1 28.0 33.3 53.0 49.3
Sample Size 2,356 4,007 5,632 4,040 3,955 4,348
Notes: Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specications control for `baseline
variables' listed in Appendix Table A1 and are estimated in two-year dierences to account for
unobserved child xed eects. `Percent in EITC Range' is calculated as the fraction with lagged
pre-tax income less than or equal to $30,000. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the family level. **Signicant at the 5% level, *signicant at the 10% level.
Table 7: Robustness of IV Estimates for `Contemporaneous Eects' Model
Eect on 1st Stage Coecient
Child Achievement on Instrument
A. Additional Control Variables
Eect of Current Income 0.0799** 0.936**
(0.0394) (0.404)
B. No Control Variables (Except Control Function, i.e., Polynomial in Lagged Earnings)
Eect of Current Income 0.0657** 1.318**
(0.0231) (0.380)
C. Interact Control Function with Baseline Regressors
Eect of Current Income 0.0608** 1.310**
(0.0223) (0.384)
D. Include State Dummies with Baseline Regressors
Eect of Current Income 0.0645** 1.186**
(0.0258) (0.387)
E. Use NLSY-supplied Weights
Eect of Current Income 0.0508** 1.241**
(0.0259) (0.477)
F. Log Family Income Measure
Eect of Log Current Income 0.6393** 1.211**
(0.2169) (0.298)
G. Controls for Mother's Labor Market Participation and Work Hours
Eect of Current Income 0.0841** 0.901**
(0.0402) (0.371)
Eect of Mother's Participation -0.0074
(0.0456)
Eect of Mother's Work Hours (in 100's) -0.0262**
(0.0124)
Notes: Specications identical to those for `Combined Math and Reading' in Table 3 with the noted excep-
tions. Specication A controls for all variables in Appendix Table A1 and state school accountability and
welfare policies (in addition to the control function in lagged pre-tax income). Specication B controls only
for the control function. Specication C interacts the control function with all baseline regressors. Speci-
cation D includes state indicators along with all baseline regressors. Specication E uses the NLSY-supplied
weights for mothers (includes baseline controls and control function). Specication F uses log family income
rather than income measured in levels (includes baseline controls and control function). Specication G con-
trols for mother's labor market participation and hours worked in addition to baseline regressors and control
function. Sample sizes are 8,609 for Specications A{F and 8,239 for Specication G. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Signicant at the 5% level, *signicant at
the 10% level.
Table A1: Sample Characteristics for Children, their Mothers, and their Families
Entire Eligible Not Eligible Dierence
Sample for EITC for EITC (ii)-(iii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
A. Baseline Variables
male 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.00
age 11.00 11.23 10.88 0.35**
no siblings 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.05**
one sibling 0.40 0.35 0.42 -0.07**
two or more siblings 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.02
black 0.35 0.47 0.29 0.19**
hispanic 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.01
B. Additional Variables
mother's age 33.44 33.23 33.55 -0.32**
mother a high school dropout 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.11**
mother a high school graduate 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.01
mother attended some college 0.20 0.17 0.22 -0.05**
mother graduated college 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.07**
mother's AFQT score (normalized & age adjusted) -0.47 -0.77 -0.32 -0.46**
mother lived with both natural parents at age 14 0.64 0.57 0.68 -0.11**
mother's father present in household 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03**
mother's mother present in household 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.05**
number of adults in household 1.86 1.67 1.96 -0.29**
highest grade completed by mother's father 8.42 7.35 8.96 -1.63**
highest grade completed by mother's mother 9.65 8.94 10.01 -1.07**
mother married last year 0.65 0.37 0.78 -0.41**
age of mother's spouse 35.39 35.25 35.43 -0.18
mother's spouse a high school dropout 0.16 0.31 0.13 0.18**
mother's spouse a high school graduate 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.02
mother's spouse attended some college 0.20 0.14 0.21 -0.07**
mother's spouse a college graduate 0.14 0.03 0.16 -0.14**
year 1993 1993 1993 0.13
missing observation indicators:
mother's AFQT score 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01*
mother lived with both natural parents at age 14 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00*
mother's father present in household 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
mother's mother present in household 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
number of adults in household missing 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
highest grade completed by mother's father 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03**
highest grade completed by mother's mother 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00
age of mother's spouse 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
mother's spouse's education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
number of child-year observations 9,796 3,286 6,510
number of children 4,412 2,019 3,249
Notes: Unit of observation is a child-year, where children and parents can appear repeatedly in the sample.
The sample is restricted to observations used in our IV analysis: children must have valid math and reading
PIAT scores, child control measures (in panel A), and family income measures in a year to be included.
Children must also have at least two years of valid observations to be included. Race of the child is based
on the reported race of the mother. Mother's education variables represent completed education when the
mother is age 23. Average spousal education and age are reported for the sample of married mothers (sample
sizes are 6,334, 1,228 and 5,106 for columns (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively). In column (iv), ** denotes
statistical signicance at 5% level, and * denotes statistical signicance at 10% level.
